TY - JOUR
T1 - The moral significance of protecting environmental and cultural objects
AU - Bastian, B.
AU - Crimston, C. R.
AU - Klebl, C.
AU - van Lange, P. A. M.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The PLOS ONE Staff. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
PY - 2023/2/9
Y1 - 2023/2/9
N2 - A powerful avenue through which to promote the preservation of the natural and cultural
environment is to afford cultural and environmental objects moral significance. In this
research, we examine a range of factors that may give rise to moral concern regarding the
protection of culturel and environmental objects as ends in themselves. In this way, we also
extend theorizing and evidence beyond a focus on sentience as a focal determinant of
moral significance Across five studies we show that non-sentient objects can sometimes be
viewed as possessing intrinsically valuable properties that afford them moral standing (independent of their extrinsic/means-end value or any perception of their capacity to think and
feel). People judge it morally wrong to harm things that are beautiful, sacred, rare, or old,
and this cannot be explained merely by their usefulness or economic value. Our findings
provide new insight into ways to elevate the protection of natural and cultural objects to an
issue of moral significance, and suggest avenues through which to motivate the preservation of a natural and cultural environments.
AB - A powerful avenue through which to promote the preservation of the natural and cultural
environment is to afford cultural and environmental objects moral significance. In this
research, we examine a range of factors that may give rise to moral concern regarding the
protection of culturel and environmental objects as ends in themselves. In this way, we also
extend theorizing and evidence beyond a focus on sentience as a focal determinant of
moral significance Across five studies we show that non-sentient objects can sometimes be
viewed as possessing intrinsically valuable properties that afford them moral standing (independent of their extrinsic/means-end value or any perception of their capacity to think and
feel). People judge it morally wrong to harm things that are beautiful, sacred, rare, or old,
and this cannot be explained merely by their usefulness or economic value. Our findings
provide new insight into ways to elevate the protection of natural and cultural objects to an
issue of moral significance, and suggest avenues through which to motivate the preservation of a natural and cultural environments.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85188441100&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0300942
DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0300942
M3 - Comment/debate
SN - 1932-6203
VL - 19
JO - PLoS ONE
JF - PLoS ONE
IS - 3 March
M1 - e0300942
ER -