The moral/conventional distinction

Nicholas Southwood*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

    55 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judgements are importantly different in kind. Yet a compelling vindicating account of the moral/conventional distinction has proven persistently elusive. The distinction is typically explicated in terms of either formal properties (the Form View) or substantive properties (the Content View) of the principles that figure in the judgements. But the most promising versions of these views face serious difficulties. After reviewing the difficulties with the standard accounts, I propose a new way of explicating the moral/conventional distinction in terms of the role that social practices play in grounding the judgements (the Grounds View).

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)761-802
    Number of pages42
    JournalMind
    Volume120
    Issue number479
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jul 2011

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'The moral/conventional distinction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this