The nuclear energy aspirants: Egypt and Vietnam

The desire for cleaner, more reliable energy sources has spawned a new generation of nuclear energy aspirants, almost half of which are located in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Many scholars and practitioners believe this development has the potential to stall disarmament momentum, particularly once nuclear reductions among the nuclear weapon states (nws) reach a certain threshold.1 These concerns are understandable because history has shown that nuclear weapons programs have oft en developed under the guise of peaceful nuclear programs.2 Moreover, despite the introduction of stronger nuclear nonproliferation measures to address this and other nuclear dangers (such as access to nuclear materials by terrorist groups), there has been resistance among some nuclear energy aspirants to what are oft en regarded as burdensome and discriminatory new obligations.3 The potential for a new tranche of nuclear threshold states to emerge in the future, all with latent nuclear capabilities and breakout options, is impossible to rule out while this resistance continues. This is a major driver of renewed U.S. and uk disarmament leadership, on the basis that eff orts to demonstrate concrete progress on disarmament could reinvigorate commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, including (perhaps especially) among new nuclear energy aspirants.4 This chapter examines the nuclear energy programs and nonproliferation and disarmament diplomacy of two key nuclear energy aspirants: Egypt and Vietnam. Of the many nuclear energy aspirants that could have been chosen as individual case studies, these two states were selected for three reasons: (1) both states have the potential to develop indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities at some point in the foreseeable future if they choose to do so; (2) both states are located in regions where nuclear energy aspirations are now widespread and well established, but which diff er signifi cantly in terms of their security dynamics; and (3) both states have signifi cant potential to infl uence regional and global nonproliferation and disarmament momentum because they are key regional players and are likely to remain so. A goal of the analysis is to explore the attitudes of Egypt and Vietnam to existing nonproliferation measures, such as the safeguards Additional Protocol (ap) (a voluntary measure that increases the transparency of nuclear programs) and to new and proposed initiatives, such as internationalized fuel cycle arrangements (the goal of which is to prevent the further spread of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities-the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle that can provide a latent nuclear weapons capability). First, how are Egypt and Vietnam responding to eff orts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and what factors are infl uencing their policies? Second, is there any evidence to suggest that new disarmament momentum is infl uencing (or could infl uence) the willingness of Egypt or Vietnam to jump on board and introduce new nonproliferation measures? Lastly, are there any indications that the nuclear intentions of either state might be anything other than the peaceful ones they declare, and can any credible scenarios be foreseen that might encourage them to develop nuclear weapons? These are all important questions, the answers to which will help us assess the prospects for sustaining disarmament momentum in the years ahead.