The paradox of persisting opposition

Robert E. Goodin*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    12 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    If voters accord evidentiary value to one another's reports, revising their own views in the light of them as Bayesian rationality requires, then even relatively small electoral majorities ought to prove rationally compelling and opposition ought rationally to vanish. For democratic theory, that is a jarring result. While there are no resources for avoiding that result within the Bayesian model itself, there are various aspects of the political process lying outside that model which do serve to underwrite the rationality of persistent opposition to majority opinion.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)109-146
    Number of pages38
    JournalPolitics, Philosophy and Economics
    Volume1
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 2002

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