The Patron's Dilemma: The Dynamics of Foreign-Supported Democratization

We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime's foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critical dimension is the patron's beliefs about the potential democracy's policies rather than its value for democracy or the alliance goods. Patron support hinges on democratic movement signaling of its capacity to rule, popular support, and commitment to preserving the alliance. To test our theory, we analyze twenty-five democratic openings in American cold war clients, followed by case studies of US-aided democratization episodes in the Philippines and South Korea. We conclude with an analysis of the recent Egyptian revolution.