TY - JOUR

T1 - The Persuasiveness of Democratic Majorities

AU - Goodin, Robert E.

AU - Estlund, David

PY - 2004/5

Y1 - 2004/5

N2 - Under the assumptions of the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, majority verdicts are virtually certain to be correct if the competence of voters is greater than one-half, and virtually certain to be incorrect if voter competence is less than one-half. But which is the case? Here we turn the Jury Theorem on its head, to provide one way of addressing that question. The same logic implies that, if the outcome saw 60 percent of voters supporting one proposition and 40 percent the other, then average voter competence must either be 0.60 or 0.40. We still have to decide which, but limiting the choice to those two values is a considerable aid in that.

AB - Under the assumptions of the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, majority verdicts are virtually certain to be correct if the competence of voters is greater than one-half, and virtually certain to be incorrect if voter competence is less than one-half. But which is the case? Here we turn the Jury Theorem on its head, to provide one way of addressing that question. The same logic implies that, if the outcome saw 60 percent of voters supporting one proposition and 40 percent the other, then average voter competence must either be 0.60 or 0.40. We still have to decide which, but limiting the choice to those two values is a considerable aid in that.

KW - Condorcet Jury Theorem

KW - epistemic democracy

KW - voter competence

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34248049876&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/1470594X04042960

DO - 10.1177/1470594X04042960

M3 - Article

SN - 1470-594X

VL - 3

SP - 131

EP - 142

JO - Politics, Philosophy and Economics

JF - Politics, Philosophy and Economics

IS - 2

ER -