Abstract
Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far. Video Abstract link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eOSlPVYxI8&feature=youtu.be.
Original language | English |
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Article number | e12668 |
Journal | Philosophy Compass |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2020 |