TY - JOUR
T1 - The Symmetry Between Controlling Pollution By Price and Controlling It By Quantity
AU - PEZZEY, J
PY - 1992/11
Y1 - 1992/11
N2 - Under ideally competitive conditions, both controlling pollution by price (using a combined charge-subsidy scheme) and controlling it by quantity (using a marketable permit scheme) can achieve short- and long-run efficiency and also political acceptability, provided that both schemes embody the same degree of environmental ownership. The resulting full symmetry between control by price and control by quantity, a symmetry overlooked in the literature because of the entry-exit assumptions automatically made for most subsidy schemes, allows a useful practical choice to be made between the two control systems.
AB - Under ideally competitive conditions, both controlling pollution by price (using a combined charge-subsidy scheme) and controlling it by quantity (using a marketable permit scheme) can achieve short- and long-run efficiency and also political acceptability, provided that both schemes embody the same degree of environmental ownership. The resulting full symmetry between control by price and control by quantity, a symmetry overlooked in the literature because of the entry-exit assumptions automatically made for most subsidy schemes, allows a useful practical choice to be made between the two control systems.
KW - Taxes
UR - https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=anu_research_portal_plus2&SrcAuth=WosAPI&KeyUT=WOS:A1992KA83000012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS_CPL
U2 - 10.2307/135776
DO - 10.2307/135776
M3 - Article
SN - 0008-4085
VL - 25
SP - 983
EP - 991
JO - Canadian Journal of Economics
JF - Canadian Journal of Economics
IS - 4
ER -