The trouble with Mary

Victoria Mcgeer*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Two arguments are famously held to support the conclusion that consciousness cannot be explained in purely physical or functional terms - hence, that physicalism is false: the modal argument and the knowledge argument. While anti-physicalists appeal to both arguments, this paper argues there is a methodological incoherence in jointly maintaining them: the modal argument supports the possibility of zombies; but the possibility of zombies undercuts the knowledge argument. At best, this leaves anti-physicalists in a considerably weakened rhetorical position. At worst, it shows that commonsense intuitions on which anti-physicalists rely mislead us about the true nature of conscious experience.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)384-393
    Number of pages10
    JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
    Volume84
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2003

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