Abstract
Central parts of the natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf assume that persons by nature have individual realms of their own (suum), violations of which constitute a wrong. This is the basis for their accounts of promises, ownership and reactions against wrongs. These accounts are significantly independent of any assumption that a superior being imposes obligations: rather, the individuals themselves create obligations by their own acts of will. The translator's introducton draws attention to the author's relation to H�gerstr�m, and remarks briefly on related points in Ames, K�hler and Georges Davy
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 197-224 |
Journal | Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought |
Volume | 1 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |