The Wrongs of Relational Inequalities

Éliot Litalien*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

While there seems to be enough of a consensus as to what distinguishes relational equality from other approaches to equality, relational egalitarians do not seem to agree on what makes inegalitarian relations wrong. This chapter addresses the issue head-on. It proposes that the wrong-making feature of relational inequality can be located in its effects on agency: relational inequalities are wrong because they hinder or reduce the agency of persons. The chapter has two parts. In the first part, three different rationales for the wrongness of inegalitarian relations that can be found in the literature are identified and showed to be unsatisfactory. The second part develops an original proposal for the wrongness of inegalitarian relations. To do so, it first offers a two-fold account of agency, which pinpoints something that we all, as agents, (should) care deeply about. It then focuses on relations of domination and oppression to make the main argument that inegalitarian relations are wrong due to their adverse effects on agency.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAutonomy and Equality
Subtitle of host publicationRelational Approaches
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages80-102
Number of pages23
ISBN (Electronic)9781000469554
ISBN (Print)9780367416898
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2021
Externally publishedYes

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