Abstract
Across four experimental studies (NStudy 1 = 466, a hypothetical movement in Bhutan, NStudy 2 = 447, a hypothetical movement in the United Kingdom, NStudy 3 = 463, a hypothetical movement in Bhutan, NStudy 4 = 460, a real movement in the United States) and an integrated data analysis, we examined when third parties (i.e., those who are not actively engaged in the movement) will support a social movement that permits the use of violence. In Studies 1–3, third parties were more willing to support violence when it was framed as having shifted to violence when nonviolence failed to achieve their goals. Mediation analyses revealed that a shift toward permitting violence reduced support to the extent that the shift created perceived moral decline in the social movement (Studies 1–3), but increased when the shift was perceived to be a last resort (Study 3). Last, we showed (Study 4) most effects disappear when third parties are told that they may be in close proximity to the violence (Study 4). These suggest third parties can and do support the use of violence as well as when and why such support is offered.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 409-419 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Peace and Conflict |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 6 Mar 2023 |