Toward a theorization of ideal type bureaucratic regimes: A comparative perspective from India and Pakistan

Previous studies on bureaucracy have enhanced our comprehension of bureaucracies’ roles and impacts in the policy process. However, a gap exists in the public administration literature regarding the conceptualization of bureaucracy through the lens of “Bureaucratic Regimes.” To address this gap, this article theorizes the concept of a “bureaucratic regime” and categorizes it into six distinct ideal types: Enabling, Inhibiting, Semi-effective, Ineffective, Effective, and Kleptocratic. This classification is based on an analysis of critical factors, such as the historical legacy of colonialism, administrative traditions, political cultures, economic development, social norms, tenure security, ideational influences, welfare spending, and policy outcomes, all contributing to the formation of bureaucratic regimes. By examining the Indian Administrative Service and the Pakistan Administrative Service, this study asserts that these services exhibit characteristics of a “Kleptocratic Bureaucratic Regime.” This regime is characterized by the extensive privileges enjoyed by its officers, resulting in substantial public expenditure but subpar policy outcomes. The study highlights the significance of viewing bureaucratic regimes as valuable conceptual tools for comparative analysis and policy evaluation. Consequently, it contributes not only to public administration theory but also holds implications for practical policymaking.