Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing how and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence

John Bengson*, Marc A. Moffett

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    15 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Some of our actions manifest states or qualities of mind, such as intelligence and skill. But what are these states or qualities, and how are they manifested in action? We articulate and examine general intellectualist and anti-intellectualist answers to such questions. One aim is to illuminate some of the main issues and arguments in the contemporary debate over knowledge how. A second aim is to highlight the broader theoretical significance of knowledge how, which may serve as a hinge on which our general understanding of mind and action turns. The role of knowledge how in various debates in ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science is also discussed.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationKnowing How
    Subtitle of host publicationEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
    PublisherOxford University Press
    ISBN (Electronic)9780199932368
    ISBN (Print)9780195389364
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 24 May 2012

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