Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation

Seamus Bradley*, Katie Steele

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1287-1303
Number of pages17
JournalErkenntnis
Volume79
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2014
Externally publishedYes

Cite this