Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation

Seamus Bradley; Katie Steele

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9529-1

Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation

Seamus Bradley^*
, Katie Steele

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1287-1303
Number of pages	17
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	79
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9529-1
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2014
Externally published	Yes

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10.1007/s10670-013-9529-1

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AB - Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.

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Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation

Abstract

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