Abstract
In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp - e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable - probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 100-103 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Theoria |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |