Unsharp sharpness

Nils Eric Sahlin; Paul Weirich

doi:10.1111/theo.12025

Unsharp sharpness

Nils Eric Sahlin, Paul Weirich

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp - e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable - probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	100-103
Number of pages	4
Journal	Theoria
Volume	80
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12025
Publication status	Published - 2014
Externally published	Yes

Access to Document

10.1111/theo.12025

Cite this

@article{44eac022993c4135ad963d66f88b22ae,

title = "Unsharp sharpness",

abstract = "In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp - e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable - probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), G{\"a}rdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.",

keywords = "imprecise probabilities, rational choice, sequential choice",

author = "Sahlin, \{Nils Eric\} and Paul Weirich",

year = "2014",

doi = "10.1111/theo.12025",

language = "English",

volume = "80",

pages = "100--103",

journal = "Theoria",

issn = "0040-5825",

publisher = "John Wiley \& Sons Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Unsharp sharpness

AU - Sahlin, Nils Eric

AU - Weirich, Paul

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp - e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable - probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.

AB - In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp - e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable - probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.

KW - imprecise probabilities

KW - rational choice

KW - sequential choice

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84892826111

U2 - 10.1111/theo.12025

DO - 10.1111/theo.12025

M3 - Article

SN - 0040-5825

VL - 80

SP - 100

EP - 103

JO - Theoria

JF - Theoria

IS - 1

ER -

Unsharp sharpness

Abstract

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this