Abstract
I argue that the why be rational? challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the �why be moral?� challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered � the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account � and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the �first-personal authority account�, which holds that rational requirements are what I call �standpoint-relative demands� concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 9-30 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Ethics |
Volume | 119 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2008 |