Wage dispersion and team performance: A theoretical model and evidence from baseball

Robert Breunig*, Bronwyn Garrett-Rumba, Mathieu Jardin, Yvon Rocaboy

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    21 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We develop a general theoretical model of the effect of wage dispersion on team performance which nests two possibilities: wage inequality may have either negative or positive effects on team performance. A parameter which captures the marginal cost of effort, which we estimate using game-level data from Major League Baseball, determines whether wage dispersion and team performance are negatively or positively related. We find low marginal cost of effort; consequently, wage disparity is negatively related to team performance. Game and season-level regressions also indicate a negative relationship between inequality and performance. We discuss a variety of interpretations of our results.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)271-281
    Number of pages11
    JournalApplied Economics
    Volume46
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 2014

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