Weighing reasons

Garrett Cullity*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What is involved in weighing normative reasons against each other? One attractive answer is the following Simple Picture: a fact is a reason for action when it counts in its favor; this relation comes in different strengths or weights; the weights of the reasons for and against an action can be summed; the reasons for performing the action are sufficient when no other action is more strongly supported, overall; the reasons are decisive when it is most strongly supported; one ought to perform the action there is most reason to perform; rational deliberation is weighing reasons correctly; and acting rationally is doing what one has sufficient reasons to do. This chapter examines the adequacy of this picture, concluding that while in some respects it needs modification or correction, in others the jury is out.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages423-442
Number of pages20
ISBN (Print)9780199657889
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jul 2018
Externally publishedYes

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