What Physicalists Have to Say about the Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Suppose that, for one reason or another, the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of physicalism. Even so, it remains the case that there is a pressing question for physicalists raised by the argument. Does Mary acquire old information or misinformation when she leaves the black and white room? Answering this question requires physicalists to address the tricky question of the informational content of colour experiences - what information do colour experiences deliver by virtue of being the kinds of experiences they are?.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)511-524
    Number of pages14
    JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
    Volume93
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2016

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