Abstract
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191–225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383–96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive-form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator but also to the nature of the deviation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 315-330 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Volume | 58 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2017 |