WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME

George J. Mailath; Volker Nocke; Lucy White

doi:10.1111/iere.12219

WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME

George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke^*, Lucy White

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191–225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383–96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive-form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator but also to the nature of the deviation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	315-330
Number of pages	16
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	58
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12219
Publication status	Published - May 2017

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10.1111/iere.12219

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title = "WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME",

abstract = "In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191–225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383–96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive-form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator but also to the nature of the deviation.",

author = "Mailath, {George J.} and Volker Nocke and Lucy White",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} (2017) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association",

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JO - International Economic Review

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ER -

WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME

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