Will there be war over Taiwan? Structural stability and policy pitfalls in cross-Strait deterrence

Despite a large literature on the prospects for a US-China war over Taiwan, there have been few attempts to apply international relations theory to this issue. This article addresses that gap, identifying theoretical sources of conflict while arguing that war remains very avoidable. Recent trends have exacerbated each of the foundational mechanisms for war: mutual uncertainty, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility. However, cross-Strait deterrence remains structurally stable, and the significance of recent developments has been overstated. Reunification by force carries extreme risks for China and would likely incur high military and economic costs even in a best-case scenario. Less commonly recognised, however, is that the benefits to China of retaking Taiwan are tenuous. Doing so would not further China’s goals on most plausible dimensions, including security, prosperity, international status, or domestic political stability, leaving the inherent personal satisfaction China’s leaders would derive from reunification as the only propelling motivation. Reunification by force is therefore unlikely, barring fundamental shifts in the strategic situation. The argument implies that although the United States should invest in its military to counter China’s increasing capabilities, it should do so with caution and restraint, emphasising reassurance to alleviate Chinese insecurity and fear of decline and pausing economic decoupling. The greatest threat to stable deterrence is not a lack of credibility or capacity to impose costs, but rather putting China’s leaders in a desperate situation where military gambles would become attractive.